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THE  DIRECTLY  ELECTED  PARLIAMENT:  A PROGRAMNE  FOR  ACTION 
!((Jed 
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Direct Elections  to  the  European Parliament,  now 
scheduled  to be held for  the first  time in June  next year, 
shou~d make  it possible significantly to  extend the influence 
of  the peoples  of  the Member  States in the Community's 
decisions making..  If such  an extension does  indeed  take 
place,  the  Comnunity will,  I  believe,  be  able  to enter a 
ne\v  much  more  dynamic  phase of  development  based upon  the 
foundation of much  more  complete  public trust than at 
present in all its institutions and  policies. 
But it is very  important not  to  imagine  that there 
is some  inexorable historical or sociological  law which 
guarantees  that once  they are directly elected,  European 
t-1Ps  will have  a  substantial influence upon  Community  policy. 
The  formal  powers  of the  European Parliament are,  in 
comparison wi.th  those  of most  of  the  Comnrunity' s  national 
Parliaments,  very  limited.  Unless  the new  Parliament 
conducts itself with  considerable skill and wisdo:r.,  i.t is 
perfectly possible that it will make  very little impact. 
In my  view,  a  failure by  the directly elected 
Parliament  to realise the high hopes  that many  have 
invested in it could have  a  very  damaging effect upon 
public attitudes  towards  the  Com1nunity.  I  would like today 
therefore  to  talk about  the manner  in wh,ich  bo.th  the 
Parliament,  and also  the body  of which  I  am  a  Member,  the 
European Commission,  must  behave if the Parliament's 
effectiveness is to  be maximised. 
*  *  *  *  * - 2  -
Avo:L•li ng  __ national  ctl1'].1(~gj cs_ 
The  410 members  of  the  new  Parliament will  incl\Jde 
people  from many  different  nationc:~l  backg·rounds  and 
constitutional traditions,  very  fc-;;.v  uf  whom  will have 
experiencE~ of  the  Community's  institutionsQ  In these 
circumstances it will be  very difficult for  Euro-NPs  to 
identify and  to apply  the  approach most  likely to yield 
the best results. 
It is probably inevitable that many  of  them \vill 
be  tempted  to  set their sights upon acquiring powers  in 
relation to  the  Community's  other institutions analogous  to 
the  powers  enjoyed  by national  parliaments in relation 
to national  goverrunents.  Such  a  course,  however,  would  be 
entirely inappropriate,  and  almost certainly extremely 
damaging  to Parliament's prospects of increasing its 
influence. 
It would  be  inappropriate because all the institutions 
of  the  Community,  including the Parliament,  are quite 
different,  both in form  and  function,  from  those  of  the 
Community's  national governments.  And  it \.vould  be  damaging 
to  the Parliament's prospects  because it would  be  bound 
to  lead  to  a  major  constitutional collision with  the 
Council  of Ministers in which  the Parliament would  be 
bound  to sustain by far  the  severest injuries. 
.  - . 
The  American Congress 
:-3 The  American _CO_Ilf,ress 
To  "tvarn  of  the  dangers  of'  relying too heavily on  the 
analogies offered by  their own  national Parliaments is not 
of  course  to  say  that MEPs  should not try to learn from  the 
constitutional experience of others.  One  of  the features 
which will distinguish  the directly  elected Parliament  from 
# 
most  of its national  counterparts within the  Community  is its 
lack of  the  power  to  form governments.  This is a  characteristic 
which it 'l;vill  share,  ho~Jever, with the American Congress, 
and in my  view the Parliament would  be well  advised closely 
to exrunine  how  Congress  has  acquired its very formidable 
position within the American political system.  For although 
it is true that Congress  enjoys legislative powers  that the 
directly elected Parliament \vill lack,  another major  source 
of its influence has  been  the use of its committee  system 
systematically and relentlessly to demand  from  the  executive 
detailed explanations and  justifications - very often in 
public session - of every aspect of federal  policy. 
There  can be no  doubt whatever that the knowledge 
that they will have  to  explain and defend their actions 
before Congressional  Committees  has  a  very substantial and 
salutary effect upon  the actions of American  Gove~nments. 
I  am  convinced that if the European Parliament follows 
Congress'  example  and concentrates primarily upon ensuring 
that the Council  of Ministers  and  the European Commission 
are obliged to  provide  the fullest possible  justification 
for their behaviour before both its specialist committees 
and also its meetings  ~n plenary session, .it will be able 
to wield much  greater influence  than its limited legal 
powers  might  suggest is likely. 
./. by  the Presidency)  and  the  Commission already  appear  be£o1.c 
Parliament.  But  because  nomins.ted HEi?s  also have  burdcnso,~:r.:: 
duties  in their  o~m national Parliaments,  they  simply  do  r,ot 
have  the  time  - not  least the  t:inte  for  prep.:trotory  res8~;.!:•:.}J  -· 
to make  the most  of  the opportunities ,,;rhich 
I 
~  •  -~  .  .  •  '  ~  •  ...  ,  •.'  ··,  C'  SuC£1  ,.Jp!}.::?-·.,}  <.t,_,, __ (.,-, 
ought  to offer-for eliciting information by  meD..ns  of  senrcbi.:g 
and perr,istent questioning.  One  of  the ·main  advccntagcs  of 
direct elections is that most  directly elected HEPs  v.Jill  cot 
be  members  of national Parliaments  and will not,  therefore~' 
be  similarly  constrai~ed. 
Another feature  of  the  present Parliament which  sonH::\oJfFI.t 
blunts its effectiveness is its habit of holding most  of 
its corrn11ittee  meetings  in private.  I  believe that  the 
directly elected Parliament  should  expose its  Comm~ttee 
sessions much  more  often than its predecessor to  the  public 
gaze:  in the nature of  things,  the wider the  audience  the 
more  anxious will  be. those who  have  to appear before  the 
Committees  adequately  to  account  for their actions. 
It has  sometimes  been argued  that unless Parliament's 
Committees meet  in private  the  Cmmnission and  the  Council '\vill 
become  much  less willing than at present  to  speak to MEPs 
frankly.  I  accept  that  there may  be  a  very  fe'tv  areas of 
policy where  this is true,  and  therefore  I  am  not  arguing  that 
all Committee meetings  should be  open.  But generally 
speaking, Ministers  and  Commissioners  are surely  likely to 
find it less, not more,  easy  to  justify·a refusal  to 
disclose  information if that refusal is likely to  be widely 
known. 
./. - 5  -
Th·~  nePd  for Parl  i~J>!lent  to  socak with  a  coherent voice 
The  effectiveness of the  approach  I  ar;1  rccom;:1ending  \vill  be 
severely impaired,  however,  if directly elected  ~1Ps fail  to 
recogr;ise  ar:othcr  c~~sco:~tial  fYt'CCl)r,clition  of  the  ~;:.Jccc~ssfu1 
exercise of  influence  by  a  body  ~~rrncd  '\·Jith  only  lir:~ite<l  lE!gn1 
sanction!>  namely,  the  possession of  a  coherent collective vo.i  v.~~ 
The  need  to  justify themselves  before Parliament is not  lC~eJ.·,~ 
to weigh heavily upon Ninisters or Coi;"::nissioners,  nor  to 
their policies, if the Parliament is knO\m  to be  riven by  n  Hcltcr. 
of conflicting factionai or national  vimv-points  - not  least  bc:;:·.:-IU~~<.:: 
in that event Parliament is likely to enjoy very little respect 
with  the  European public \vhich it is supposed  to represent. 
Obviously,  the  Europcnn  Parliament  cannot  and  should  not 
aspire  to achieve unanimity on every issue - if it did it \-lould 
be  a  very dull place indeed  - but it \·7ill  only  achieve  the  moral 
authority upon which its success must  depend if a  clear majority 
of its Members  are  iden~ified with  a  well-defined and  consistent 
view of how  the  Community  should develop and of  the  policies 
which it should pursue. 
A change which would greatly facilitate,  though it ,  ..... ould not 
guarantee,  the  formation of  s~ch a  majority would be  the  emergence 
in the  Parlinm~nt of  a  better organised party  system.  In particul.:-1-:-
there is a  need  for a  reduction in the  n~~ber of political groups 
sitting separately  from  each other and  for  the  attainment by  the 
larger groups  of  a  much  greater degree of internal coheGion.  It is 
therefore very  encouraging to observe  the manner in which  the 
prospect of direct  electib~s is focussing  the attention of  ~early 01 
Europe's political parties on precisely these problems. 
./. .•  6  -
The  policies  __  the  P.:n::.LJ.:::xnen_t:  \.,:d]-_l__\·7-!:._f?h  to_~?_~r·suc 
•If  the  Parlia;rrent  does  succeed in forrrting  n.n  o.grced  v-5.::\·J 
of  hmv  the  Community  should develop,  vJhat  is that view likely 
to  be? 
Obviously  this is  a  question to which  there  can  be 
no  precise or dogmatic.answers.  One  guess  I  would hazard, 
however,  is that the Parliament will press  strongly for 
improvements  in certain aspects  of  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy.  In striking contrast  to  the Agricultural  Council, 
which  consists almost entirely of Ministers whose  primary 
duty is to  safeguard the interests of  farmers,  the directly 
elected Parliament will contain representatives of all the 
groups  in society affected by  agricultural policy,  including 
nnt only producers,  but:  also  consumers.  It therefore  seems 
probable that it will lend its support  to  the Comnission's 
efforts effectively  to  tackle  the  CAP's  main  problems  by 
means  of.a tough  price policy. 
As  Budget  Commissioner  I  find  the prospect of  such 
support particularly welcome,  for it is mainly  by  restricting 
common  prices  to sensible levels,  that  the  huge  budgetary 
cost of  the  CAP  can be  contained.  But  some  of  the other 
policies which  I  believe  the Parliament may  well want  to 
pursue  cause me  grave disquiet. 
./. ~~·-~-----------------
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One  of my  fc."!rs  is that the Parliament may  press 
for  the  indiscriminate transfer of as many  responsibiliti0.s 
as  possible  from national to  Corrnnunity  level.  \tJhere  the 
Cowmuni ty' s  institutions can discharge a  t.'lsk w,ore  effect~~-vcLy 
I 
or more  cheaply  than national  governments  there is clearly 
a  strong case for  such  a  transfero  But equally clearly it 
would  be  quite wrong  to give  the  Conrrnunity  responsi.bilities 
in those areas where  no  practical advantages for the 
Conununi ty' s  citizens· would  be  secured by  doing so. 
Existing MEPs,  who  are all members  of national 
parliaments as well,  do  not,  for  the most part, have  any 
difficulty in recognising this.  But  directly elected MEPs, 
most  of whom  'tvill  not sit in national  legisVttures,  may 
well  be  tempted  to press  for transfers of  competence which 
are not  justified merely in order to increase the  E11ropean 
Parliament's political importance at the expense of its 
national counterparts.  Conversely,  there is a  danger that 
national parliaments containing very  few  European MPs  will 
resist all transfers  to  Community  level, irrespective of 
the merits of the  case  • 
.  ·  In my  view,  the danger of  the  European Parliament 
anc;l  national  P~rliaments adopting· such extreme  positions 
makes  it very important indeed to establish in each Member 
State effective constitutional and  administrative arrangements 
for keeping national  and  supra-national.MPs in close  and 
frequent  contact of  the kind that 'tdll enable  them  to 
formulate  an agreed and rational view of  the proper division 
of  competence  between  them. 
./. A  sc~concl possibili.ty  tha.t  causes  me  concern is 
that the Parliament '\vill  have  a  t'~ndency to press  for 
h  l  .  ,...  "l  .  t  t'  .  t  l'  .  t  e  acopt:Lon  01:  unt1ecessar.l.  y  :Ln  c:.cven -J.onu:.;:  po  l.C1 c:s 
enta\ling unjustifiably high  pubLi. c  expcncli ture.  He  h:we 
all seen h.o-vJ  national political pnrties of \·Jhatever 
ideological  persuasion tend  to  push  each other dovm  the 
interventionist road  by  attempting  to outbiJ each other 
in the  oromises  they make  to  their electorates  to  remedy 
a  whole.variety of  social  and  economic ills by means  of 
increased regulation and  by  the  public provision of 
physical amenities  and financial  subsidies. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  there  are  some  important 
constraints at national  level upon this process.  Most 
voters  judge national  governments  not merely  on the basis of  the 
public services  and handouts which  they  provide but also 
by  other tests.·  In .particular they require governments 
to avoid excessive taxation and  to manage  the  economy 
in a  manner \>Jhich  penni ts high  growth  and employment  and 
low inflation.  In practice of  course no  national  govcr1~nent 
is likely to  do  very well  by  these tests unless State 
intervention and  expenditure are kept within reasonable 
boupds.  And  the  recognition that this is so very often 
has  a  somewhat  dampening  effect on national politicians' 
dirigiste ambitions. 
./. - 9  -
A directly elected MP,  hmvev<•r,  will be in a  rather 
different position.  TI1e  Community  doe~;  levy taxation.  But 
the manner  i.n  which it does  so is not Hidely understood and, 
· ~-n)", 7ay,  the  burden which it imposes  i::;  too  small  in compnris•1.1 
with  nation.:1l  taxation to ca.usc  the el<'ctorate  serious  conccru,  , 
Similarly,  the  Community  has  an imporl<tnt  role in overall 
economic management,·but  because  that role is not widely 
appreciated,  the  Corrununity' s  institutions, including the 
Parliament,  are not  likely, in the foreseeable future,  to 
receive 1nuch  in the way  of either prai5e or blame  for any 
improvement  in the Member  States econotnic  performance. 
In these circumstances, many  f\1EPs  may  ~\'ell  conclude 
not merely  that  there is less need for  them  than for national 
politicians to moderate  their demands  for direct goverrunent 
action;  but also that such demands  are virtually the only  me~ns 
available  to  them for  the  purpose of impressing their 
constituents and winning their support. 
Yet  I  am  wholly  convinced  that this would be  to 
mistake the  electorate's mood.  In all the Member  States,  as 
in the Western World  as  a  whole,  what most  people are  looking 
for is not more  government put less.  Failure to recognise 
this would,  I  believe,  be  bound  to damage  the Parliament's 
credibility. 
./. 
. -- _i_ 
·~· 
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Ars.othcr  viL;l  determi1:nnt  of  the  success or  :L::LI.un~  '_, 
the  Parliam;.:nt  't·Ji ll be  the  na tu·.re  of its relationship  \·~:l th  U·:  (-: 
European  Commission.  The  Founding Fathers  of  the  Cornrnuni. ty 
emer;:,c  as  the most  po\verful  of  the  Co::u.nuni ty' s  insti  tut:i.on·:. 
I 
They  therefore  supposed that checkil:g  ancl  influencing  the  Co:·r~,:.i <::L.ic: 
would  be  the~  Parli.aro2nt' s  main  t..-::.sk;  and  to help it to  fuLti t 
that task they  g.ave  the Parliament what is by  fnr  the  rno::;t 
important of its fonn.s.l  legal  powers  - its right to dismiss  t~  ... e 
entire Comnd.ssion  by  means  of  a  r11otion  of  censure  supported \;' 
a  two-third majority of  those voting. 
In the  event,  hov.Jever,  the institutions of  the  Cor:::::,ucity 
have  evolved in a  manner very different from  that  ~1ich the 
Founding Fathers  envisaged.  Host  notably,  the  Council  of 
Ninistcrs has  acquired a  decisive superi(;rity over  the  other 
institutions which,  for better or worse, it seems unlikely 
to  lose in the  foreBeeable  future. 
If the Parliament wihes  to influence events,  therefore, 
it is primarily upon  the  Council  that it will have  to try to 
put pressure  and its prospects  of  doing  so  successfully vJill 
obviously  be greatly improved if it is prepared  to enter a 
constructive working alliance with  the  Commission.  The 
Commission also has  a  vested interest in such an alliance. 
But establishing and maintaining  a  successful  relationship 
will only be  possible if each institution acts  appropriately 
.tmvards  the other. 
•  I • 11 On  its side  the  Parliament must not try effectively to  c~E:'C~·:J.ve 
the  Cou~11i~:si.on o:f  its right of initiative.  Parlimncnt  could if :.Ll:: 
wanted,  try to use its pm·7ers  to dismiss  the  Cmmnission  to  force~  j  t 
to adopt all Parliament's amendments  to its proposals.  Yet  this 
'\oJOuld  not really be  in Pnrliam.ent' s  interest..  For if the  Co;·,tmis::.;::_:)tl 
\v<.1s  kno-vm.  to have  been  reduo~d by  'force majeur'  to  a  mere 
#" 
instrument ·of  Parliament's will, Ministers in the Council 'h7ill  h.:;:.:c:: 
no  reason to believe that the proposals which  Corrm1issioners  were 
advocating were  ones  vJhich  they  themselves  believed in.  T'nis  wot;Li 
greatly weaken  the  Commission's credibility.  And  that in turn 'tv•j\.J ~ d 
diminish  the  Commis.sion'.s ·potential usefulness  to  the Parliament  .. 
that is not  to  say,  however,  that the Commission  should not 
seek to incorporate the directly elected Parliament's views  in its 
own  proposals,  whenever it can do  so·without  compromising  the 
essential principles of its own  approach in a  g-iven  area of policy  .. 
One  of the permanent dilemmas  which  the  C01mnission  faces  Vlhen 
preparing measures  for  submission to  the Council is whether to 
propose  the  far reaching  echemes  for developing  the Cormnunity  "tmi.ch 
it would  ideally like to  see  - and which  the Parliament very often 
wishes  to  see  - or whether instead to advance much  more modest 
proposals  of_  a  kind more  likely to be palatable to national 
governments.  Often the  Con~ission chooses  the latter course because 
it not unreasonably fears  that if it asks  the Council for  too much 
it may  end up  receiving assent to nothing at. all.  A directly elected 
Parliament;  however,  is likely to press  the Cotmnission  to  take a 
much  bolder line,  and in my  view the Cotmnission would be ill-advised 
- if. it wishes  to receive support  from  the Parliament - always  to 
refuse  to  do  so. 
./. - 12  -
Yet if the  Con.m1ission  ~~·ropc·ses  bolder mea::.;·ures  hc:o;1 
Cotmc·il?  I  can  see  no  easy  solution  to  this  c}j_fficul t.y. 
It is to  be  hoped of  course  that  the directly  elected 
Parliament v:rill  itself e:"ert pressure upon  the  Council  to 
react more  constructively  to  the  Commission's  proposals. 
But  such pressure  on its  o\,7ll.  :ts  unlikely to be  sufficient 
for  the  pux:pose.  I  an  therefm:-e  increasingly convinced 
that the  Commission will have  to revise its ovm  approach 
to  the  task of persuading national  governments  to pursue 
European objectives. 
At present  the  Corrnniss:Lon  concentrates mainly 
though  by  no  means  exclusively upon attempting to influence 
govern"Tlents  by means  of private discussions with national 
Ministers  and  their officials behind  closed doors.  This 
is a  vital task which must  not  be  abandoned.  But if the 
Commission is to have  any hope  of winning  the assent for 
the more  adventurous  proposals which are  likely to be  the 
consequence  of direct elections, if it is to  persuade 
national Ministers  to discard  the blinkers  ~mich they  too 
often wear when  they  survey  the  Con~unity scene,  then 
Commissioners will also have  to be much  more  prepared than  .::-=tt 
present  to  step outside the corridors of  power  and  robustly 
to enter the arena of public debate. 
./. - 13  -
In the final  analysis  the  conduct of  the  Community's 
ne.ti.onal  governments  is  largely  de tcnnin<:(J.  by  their percept::. 
of  the  atL:.i.tudcs  ancl  cxrect.stions  of  the  naL:Lonal  clcctcn:-.~Ttc~:-
• 
to vmich  they are responsible.  v·Jhat  the  Commi.ssion  liii..lSt  t-ry 
to  do,  therefore,  is  to  explc:d.n  to  those  elec  torntes  d:L rectJ.y  ~· 
by all  the  appropriate methods  available  to  them,  the 
sub~~  tantj_al  concrete  bem~fi  ts \vhich.  Community  action can 
bring  them.  They must  try to  persuade national  electorate::; 
themselves  to bring pressure  on national  governments  to 
make  proper use of  the opportunities which  the  Cmn.~.iLU!"tity 
offers  them. 
This  of  course is  a  political  task requiring politic.?l 
skills.  But  then,  the  Commission is, and  should remain,  a 
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THE  DIRECTLY  ELECTED  PARLIAMENT: 
SUMMARY  OF  A SPEECH  BY  MR  CHRISTOPHER  TUGENDHAT  TO  THE 
INSTITUT  ROYAL  DES  AFFAIRES  1NTERNATIONALES 
Mr  Tugendhat,  Member  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  began 
by  saying  that  direct  elections to the  European  Parliament  should  make  it 
possible  to extend  the  influence  of  the people  of  Europe  in  Community 
decision  making. 
But  people  should  not  imagine  that  there  was  "some  inexorable  historical 
or  sociological  law  which  guarantees  that,  once  they are directly elected, 
European  MPs  will  have  a  substantial  influence  upon  Community  policy~ 
Warning  of  the  dangers  of  dashing  high  hopes,  Mr  Tugendhat  outlined  his  ideas 
on  the manner  in  which  Parliament  and  the  Commission  would  have  to  behave. 
He  did  not  think  that  Parliament  would  necessarily develop  along  the  same 
lines as  national  parliaments. 
Given  the differences  between  Community  and  national  institutions, any 
attempt  by  the directly-elected  Parliament  to acquire  powers  analogous  to 
those  enjoyed  by  national  Parliaments  would  be  inappropritate and  damaging 
to Parliament's prospects.  • 
The  main  power  it would  lack  was  the power  to form  a  government.  The  United 
State  Congress  was  in the  same  position.  Admittedly  Congress  had  wide 
legisl9tive powers,  but  it had  also extended  its influence within·the  American 
political  system  by  systematically  using  the  committee  system  to  control  the 
executive. 
Following  this example  Parliament  could  strengthen  its influence  considerably. 
It  could make  more  effective  use  of  its powers  of  control, arrange  for  its 
committees  to meet  more  often  in public  session,  speak  with  a  more  coherent 
collective  voice  on  major  policy  issues,  and  reduce  the  number  of political• 
groups  sitting  on  its benches • 
As  to the policies it might  wish  to pursue,  Mr  Tugendhat  taught  it probable 
that  Parliament  would  support  the tommission's efforts to  improve the  common 
agricultural policy.  He  was  concerned,  however,  that  it  should  not  press  for 
unnecessarily  interventionist policies entailing  high  publi6 expenditure. 
"In all the  Member  States, as  in  the  Western  World  as  a  whole,  what  most 
,.  •  people  are  looking  for  i s  not. more  government  but  less" • 
Turning  to the  new  Parliament's  relations  with  the  Commission,  Mr  Twgendhat 
warned  against  trying to  deprive  the  Commission  of  its right  of  initiative  • 
.!. # 
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Parliament  would  be  better advised to establish a  constructive working  alliance 
with  the  Commission. 
Too  close  a  relationship  would,  however,  weaken  the  Commission's  credibility 
and  diminish  its potential  usefulness  to  Parliament. 
"A  directly-elected  Parliament  is  Likely  to press  the  Commission  to  take 
a  much  bolder  Line,  and  the  Commission  would  be  ill-advised- if it wishes 
to  receive  support  from  the  Parliament  -always  to  refuse  to  do  so." 
hoped  But  the  Councit  the ·Council  Aoul~ have  to  be  Parliament's  main  target "It  is 
I  that  the  directly-elected  Parliament  will  itself exert  pressure  upon  the 
. 
(\  . 
Council  to  react  more  constructuvely to the  Commission's  proposals".  Buf 
if the  Commission  wanted  things  to  change  after direct  elections,"Commissioners 
will  also  have  to  be  much  more  prepared  than  at  present  to  step outside the 
corridors of  power  and  robustly enter the  arena  of  public  debate". 
The  Commission  would  have  to try to  convince  the  electorate of  the  substantial 
benefits that  Community  action  coulo  bring. 
This  was  a  political task-,  but  then  the  Commission  was,  and  would  have  to 
remain,  a  political  body. 
•  .. 